Exposure to hundreds of similar cases in the past meant that Dr Nelson was able to use a fast, pattern recognising, intuitive way of thinking that can reach conclusions with just a few data points -Type 1 thinking, whereas we medical students plodded step-wise through a slow, logical but high effort approach -Type 2 thinking.
1
Psychologists believe there is a very strong human trait to make consistent stories out of everything around us-a narrative engine. We like our world to make sense. If some of the information isn't there, we start to fill in the gaps. The only problem is, if our store of background knowledge and experience is lacking, then our story may not reflect reality. It also takes more mental effort to work things out from first principles and many of us are somewhat cognitively lazy.
1,2
Pat Croskerry, an expert in Clinical Reasoning, talks about skilled clinicians having a bank of illness scripts where the clinical presentation is mentally compared with the script and if the pattern fits, a spot diagnosis (Type 1 thinking) can be made. If the pattern is not recognised or the patient doesn't respond to treatment, then it's back to plodding through differential diagnoses or finding a different script for comparison.
3
Difficulties can arise if our spot diagnosis is wrong and we don't notice or respond to clues that something isn't right -we may develop an anchor bias -an unwillingness to consider other possibilities.
The narrative engine can suffer from other cognitive biases 4 including:
Confirmation Bias
Agreeing with evidence that supports our diagnosis (script) and ignoring data that refutes it.
Premature Closure
Facts are not checked and new data is not considered.
Search satisficing (a combination of satisfy and suffice)
Having found one diagnosis, we fail to look for a second -e.g., a small deep stab wound in the back as well as an obvious gunshot wound in the front.
Posterior Probability Bias
The diagnosis on the last 3 admissions may not be the right diagnosis this time.
Outcome Bias
A desire for a favourable outcome, e.g., blaming sepsis on pneumonia rather than an IV line infection.
We can also be strongly influenced by what Croskerry calls the cognitive miser function.
5 It sometimes takes a lot of cerebral effort to stop "diagnostic momentum" at an early stage: Did the patient mean it was the same character of pain or the same intensity of pain? Would a more systematic consideration of causes of epigastric pain (Type 2 thinking) led to a safer outcome?
At this stage, no-one knows if critical analysis of medical decision making will lead to a long term improvement in patient safety. Some units are starting to incorporate such analysis into morbidity and mortality meeting data. The concept is certainly interesting and I think we will hear more about "Clinical Reasoning" in the future.
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